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Abstract
Background: The linkage of records which refer to the same entity in separate data collections
is a common requirement in public health and biomedical research. Traditionally, record linkage
techniques have required that all the identifying data in which links are sought be revealed to at
least one party, often a third party. This necessarily invades personal privacy and requires complete
trust in the intentions of that party and their ability to maintain security and confidentiality.
Dusserre, Quantin, Bouzelat and colleagues have demonstrated that it is possible to use secure
one-way hash transformations to carry out follow-up epidemiological studies without any party
having to reveal identifying information about any of the subjects – a technique which we refer to
as "blindfolded record linkage". A limitation of their method is that only exact comparisons of
values are possible, although phonetic encoding of names and other strings can be used to allow
for some types of typographical variation and data errors.
Methods: A method is described which permits the calculation of a general similarity measure, the
n-gram score, without having to reveal the data being compared, albeit at some cost in computation
and data communication. This method can be combined with public key cryptography and
automatic estimation of linkage model parameters to create an overall system for blindfolded
record linkage.
Results: The system described offers good protection against misdeeds or security failures by any
one party, but remains vulnerable to collusion between or simultaneous compromise of two or
more parties involved in the linkage operation. In order to reduce the likelihood of this, the use of
last-minute allocation of tasks to substitutable servers is proposed. Proof-of-concept computer
programmes written in the Python programming language are provided to illustrate the similarity
comparison protocol.
Conclusion: Although the protocols described in this paper are not unconditionally secure, they
do suggest the feasibility, with the aid of modern cryptographic techniques and high speed
communication networks, of a general purpose probabilistic record linkage system which permits
record linkage studies to be carried out with negligible risk of invasion of personal privacy.
Background
Introduction
The ability to link records in separate data collections
which refer to the same entity is a common requirement
in public health and biomedical research [1]. Where
records in separate data collections share a common,
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form. Where a common key is not available, the task is
more difficult, and typically an ensemble of non-unique,
partially-identifying attributes such as name, date of birth
and address are used to probabilistically infer which
records refer to the same entity. Often these attributes are
time-variant (for example, residential address) or
recorded with some degree of error.
In order to carry out record linkage using traditional
methods, it is necessary for someone (or some organisa-
tion) to be given access to the ensemble of non-unique
identifying attributes for all of the relevant records in the
data collections to be linked. Good practice dictates that
medical and other substantive attributes should be
removed from the records before passing them to a person
or organisation undertaking the record linkage operation
(the record linker). A number of protocols for achieving
this have been described [2-4]. A defect of these protocols
is that they do little to obfuscate the source of those
records. In many circumstances knowledge of the data
source permits significant and highly confidential infor-
mation to be inferred about individuals who are identi-
fied in the candidate records to be linked. Furthermore,
the record linker necessarily requires access to all relevant
records in all the data collections to be linked because
there is no way of knowing prospectively which records
will match – thus these methods require the disclosure of
confidential information about large numbers of individ-
uals, albeit to a small number of people who actually
undertake the linkage.
For example, a research project may need to determine
which individuals who appear in a population-based reg-
ister of people suffering from hepatitis C also appear in a
separate population-based register of cases of hepatocellu-
lar carcinoma (which may be part of a wider cancer regis-
try). If the research project requires that individuals whose
records are present in both data collections be contacted
or followed up, then the researcher clearly needs to know
their identities. If no follow-up is planned, then the
researcher need not know their identities. Either way, the
identities of all individuals in each of the two data collec-
tions, many or most of whom will not appear in both,
need to be provided to the person or organisation per-
forming the record linkage. This disclosure of identities
represents a loss of privacy for all of the individuals on
both databases, regardless of whether they ultimately
become subjects of the study in question. The loss of pri-
vacy can be minimised by strict observance of procedures
designed to maintain confidentiality, but it cannot be
eliminated entirely when conventional record linkage
techniques are employed. In addition, there remains a
small but finite risk that the linkage operation might be
compromised by external attackers, by errant internal staff
or even through administrative or political malfeasance.
The consequences of compromise – such as misappropri-
ation and publication of the names and addresses of indi-
viduals on the Internet – are potentially devastating and,
although unlikely, must nevertheless be contemplated.
Related work
One method of mitigating such risks is to establish a
multi-party system in which all linkage is undertaken by a
central linkage bureau which is supplied with only the
identifying attributes of individuals. The sources of these
partially identifying attributes are hidden by passing them
through a proxy. Messages containing identifying infor-
mation from many sources are mixed by the proxy and
delayed by random amounts before being forwarded to
the central linkage bureau, thus obfuscating the source of
each message. Such a framework is described in detail by
Churches [5]. If such frameworks are used, a compromise
of the central linkage bureau is much less catastrophic
because no information is held about the source of the
names, addresses and other partially identifying data
items in its database – instead, this information is held by
the proxy. Simultaneous compromise of both the record
linkage agency and the proxy would be required for a seri-
ous breach of confidentiality to occur. However, it may
still be possible for the centralised linkage bureau (or an
attacker who gains access to the data held by the linkage
bureau) to infer information about the source of each
message. This could be done through analysis of missing
data items or of the way in which data items are formatted
– both of which may be characteristic of particular data
sources. In addition, such systems require many parties to
participate in order to be successful, and participation
requires adaptation of existing information systems. Thus,
they are not easy to establish.
Given these problems, methods which allow records in
separate data collections to be linked for the purposes of
specific research projects, without requiring identifying
information to be revealed to anyone who does not
already have access to it, are desirable.
One approach is to severely limit the identifying data
items which are disclosed to the record linker – an
approach which is often termed "anonymous record link-
age" [6]. This approach has the disadvantage that as the
number and details of the (partially) identifying data
items which are disclosed to the record linker are reduced,
the specificity and overall efficiency of the linkage opera-
tion are also diminished. Of course, truly anonymous
data does not contain sufficient partially identifying infor-
mation to permit any useful record linkage, by definition.
Thus, it may be better to call such approaches "partially-
identified record linkage", or perhaps, "partially de-iden-
tified record linkage".Page 2 of 17
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undertaking the record linkage operation to use all of the
partially-identifying data items, such as names and dates
of birth, which are available from the data collections
being linked, but without the need to know the actual val-
ues of those data items. These methods, which use keyed
one-way hash functions, were described in the mid-to-late
1990s by a team of French researchers [7-13]. These
researchers have also described their method as "anony-
mous record linkage", but the approach is quite different
to the aforementioned usage. We feel that "blindfolded
record linkage" is a better term, because a number of iden-
tifying data items are, in fact, used in the linkage but the
party undertaking the linkage is unable to see their values.
The adjective "blindfolded" rather than "blinded" is sug-
gested in order to remind users that such methods still
assumes that two or more parties involved in the linkage
operation will not collude in order to "remove the blind-
fold". However, unlike traditional record linkage tech-
niques, the methods provide good protection against a
single party, acting alone, attempting to invade privacy or
breach confidentiality. In this respect the qualifier "blind-
folded with both hands tied behind the back" is more
accurate, but perhaps rather too wordy.
The French methods target situations in which de-identi-
fied patient data needs to be centralised and linked for the
purposes of longitudinal (follow-up) studies. Schadow et
al. have subsequently described a related method for
using keyed hash functions to carry out on-the-fly, distrib-
uted, deterministic record linkage, that is, without any
requirement to centralise data [14]. There is also intense
interest in the knowledge discovery and data mining com-
munity in "privacy-enhanced" data mining and "secure
multi-party computation", a field first introduced by Yao
in 1982 [15]. Although it appears that almost any func-
tion can be computed securely without revealing its
inputs, all of the extant protocols do so at the expense of
communications efficiency (as do the protocols proposed
in this paper). Hirt et al. provide a brief review [16].
In this paper we will first describe the means used in the
French protocols to carry out blindfolded equality testing
of both normalised and phonetically-encoded strings. We
will then describe a new method for performing blind-
folded similarity comparisons between strings or other
short sequences. We will illustrate how these methods can
be used with asymmetrical (public key) encryption to cre-
ate blindfolded record linkage protocols suitable for vari-
ous research scenarios.
Many of the assumptions and terminology used in this
paper are borrowed from the discipline of information
system security engineering, which is concerned with
"...building systems to remain dependable in the face of
malice, error, or mischance" [17]. This is a discipline
which has been likened to "programming Satan's compu-
ter" [18]. In particular, there is a deliberate attempt to
avoid the unrealistic assumptions that individuals or
organisations will always behave as they ought, or as
expected, and that computer security mechanisms are
foolproof and will always function perfectly. Where such
assumptions are unavoidable, they are identified explic-
itly and the probability and impact of violations evalu-
ated. The names Alice, Bob and so on are traditionally
used in the cryptology literature to refer to parties who
participate in transactions or data operations. It should be
born in mind that these parties may represent the rightful
or intended recipients or custodians of some data, but
could also represent an external or internal attacker who
has gained unauthorised access to that data. Thus, it is not
only the fairly remote possibility that a researcher or com-
puter system administrator might behave unethically (or
be induced to do so) which must be considered, but also
that untrustworthy parties may gain unauthorised access
to Alice's or Bob's data.
The following protocol descriptions assume that data
communication between parties is secured through the
use of public key cryptography [19,20]. Public key cryp-
tography relies on the difficulty of factoring the key to pro-
duce pairs of very large prime numbers to encrypt data
using a pair of complementary keys belonging to each
party wishing to exchange information securely. These
keys are known as the public key and the private key. The
public key is published and can be used by anyone wish-
ing to encrypt information in such a way that it can only
be decrypted (read) by the holder of the matching private
key, and by no-one else. In practice, for reasons of compu-
tational efficiency, public key encryption and decryption
algorithms are used to pass random "session keys"
securely between parties and these session keys are used
with conventional encryption algorithms to protect the
actual data. The effect is the same as if the entire message
were encrypted or decrypted using public or private keys.
Each party's private key can also be used to digitally "sign"
messages to prove to the recipient that the party sending
the message is in fact whom they claim to be and that the
message has not been altered during the transmission
process. Usually a trusted agency known as a certificate
authority handles the distribution of public keys and
vouches for the authenticity of these keys and the bona
fides of the parties to whom they belong. Collectively
these technologies are often referred to as "public key
infrastructure" (PKI).
Minimal-knowledge value comparisons
The fundamental operation at the core of all forms of
record linkage is the comparison of partially-identifying
data items from two (or more) data sources. TypicallyPage 3 of 17
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address components), but they may be scalar quantities
such as age or date of birth. The comparison may be as
simple as determining whether the values match exactly,
or it may involve some form of similarity comparison,
such as the Levenshtein edit distance [21], or the bigram
similarity function, which is discussed in more detail
below.
Usually, the values being compared must be known to the
person or machine undertaking the comparison. How-
ever, cryptographically secure one-way hash functions can
be used to allow values to be tested for equality while hid-
ing the actual values from the entity performing the test.
A one-way hash function, such as the Secure Hash Algo-
rithm (SHA) [22], transforms a string or other series of
bytes into a new, fixed-length string (a hash value) in such
as way that it is impossible, or at least extremely difficult,
to discover the value of the original string from the hash
value. A given source string will always produce the same
hash value (assuming that little-endian/big-endian differ-
ences are accounted for, as they usually are), and the prob-
ability that two different source strings will produce the
same hash value (a "hash collision") is approximately
1.2√n where n is the number of possible hash values. The
SHA algorithm produces a 160 bit hash value, which
means that the likelihood of hash collisions is still very
small – approximately 1 in 1024 operations. Even tiny
changes in the original string cause major changes in the
resulting hash value – with the SHA algorithm change of
a single character will result in at least half of the bits in
the resulting hash value changing [23].
Problem statement and principal actors
Before setting out any protocols, it is useful to define the
problem statement and principal actors.
Alice holds a data collection (database), A, which contains
one or more attributes (also often referred to as data ele-
ments, variables, fields or columns), denoted A.a, A.b and
so on, each, containing confidential character strings
(such as names) or some other sequences or values.
Bob holds a similar but quite separate data collection, B,
also containing one or more confidential attributes, B.a,
B.b and so on.
Alice and Bob wish to determine whether any of the val-
ues in A.a match any of the values in B.a without revealing
to each other or to any other party what the actual values
in A.a and B.a are.
Carol is a third party who is trusted by Alice and Bob to
perform the processing specified in the protocols
described in this paper, and not to divulge the data which
she receives from Alice and from Bob to any other party,
including Alice and Bob.
Basic protocol
In order to perform a minimal-knowledge value compar-
ison using one-way hash functions, Alice and Bob first
agree on a particular secure hash function to use. There is
a limited number of such functions to choose from, and
in most circumstances the SHA algorithm would be used.
Alice then computes the hash of a value in her data collec-
tion and sends it to Carol. Bob does the same. Carol then
compares the two hash values which she has received. If
they are the same, then the source values in Alice's and
Bob's databases must match.
Extension to comparison of sets of values is straightfor-
ward – all that is required is some secure means of associ-
ating each hash value with the original source values in
Alice's and Bob's data collections. To do this, Alice and
Bob could attach an arbitrary, random ID number (a
nonce) to each hash digest being compared. 
Although Carol is unable to reverse the hashing process
and discover the original values, she is able to mount a
dictionary attack against the list of hashes which she
receives from Alice and Bob [24]. For example, Carol may
know (or guess) that the hash values she is given are
derived from surnames. If she computes the hashes for all
surnames in an exhaustive list (for example, derived from
a telephone book or electoral roll), and compares these
with the hashes she has received from Alice and Bob, she
may be able to discover the original values. In order to
thwart such attacks by Carol, Alice and Bob need to agree
on a secret key (ideally a random value chosen from a
large key space) which is used to transform the source val-
ues in an agreed manner before they are hashed. The
HMAC (Hashed Message Authentication Code) algorithm
provides a suitable transformation which is both well
studied and widely supported by mature software imple-
mentations [25]. We will refer to the resulting value as a
"keyed hash digest" or simply a "digest".
It should be noted that even when keyed hash digests are
used to thwart a dictionary attack, there is still a theoreti-
cal risk that Carol may be able to infer some information
about the source data values by mounting a statistical
attack in which she examines the relative frequencies of
the hash digests which she receives. For such an attack to
succeed, large numbers of digests must be available to
Carol, and she must know or be able to guess a great deal
about the frequency distribution of values in the source
data collection, and some of those values need to be rare.
The risk of a successful statistical attack against the keyed
hash digests increases if Carol has access to digests derivedPage 4 of 17
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name, residential street address and suburb) so that she is
able to correlate the relative frequencies of the hash
digests for a particular record. Mechanisms for avoiding
this situation, such as "chaffing" as suggested by Rivest
[26], are described later in this paper.
Extension to phonetically-encoded character strings
If a value in Alice's data collection is "victoria" and a value
in Bob's data collection is "Victoria ", then the resulting
keyed hash digest will be different and the comparison
will fail. Thus, Alice and Bob must also agree on a set of
pre-processing rules and transformations to render the
values to be compared as alike as possible prior to the
application of the keyed hash transformation.
The values to be compared may also contain errors – for
example, the value in Bob's data collection may be "vic-
tora". A phonetic encoding function such as Soundex or
Metaphone may be used to make the match between the
two strings more robust to spelling mistakes and typo-
graphical errors, at the expense of a greater number of
false matches (homonym errors) [27,28].
However, Soundex, Metaphone and other phonetic trans-
formations are not perfect – in particular they are not
robust with respect to errors in the initial character, or to
truncation differences. For example, "Christopher",
"Christine" and "Cristina" all have a Soundex code of
C623 whereas "Chris" has a code of C620; and "Kristine"
has a code of K623. In some cases it may be possible to
mitigate these problems by creating an array of alternative
digest values for known alternatives, such as "Liz" and
"Beth" for "Elizabeth", in an attempt to get a match, but
there are limits to the generality of this approach and
again the rate of "false" matches (homonym errors) will
inevitably increase.
Ideally, a protocol is required which permits the blind-
folded calculation by Carol and/or other trusted third par-
ties of a more general measure of similarity between the
pairs of secret strings. 
n-gram similarity comparators
The method proposed here involves the use of an n-gram
similarity score, which is often referred to as the Dice co-
efficient in the information retrieval field [29,30]. An n-
gram (also sometimes called an n-graph) is the set of sub
strings of length n in a word string. For example, the 2-
grams (bigrams) in the word "peter" are "pe", "et", "te"
and "er". The Dice co-efficient is defined as 
where bigrams() is a function which reduces a word to its
set of bigrams, and x and y the two character strings to be
compared. The Dice co-efficient (or bigram score) for
"peter" and "pete" is 2 × 3/(4 + 3)  0.86 because "pete"
contains three bigrams, "peter" contains four, and they
have three bigrams in common. Bigram scores are not reli-
able and thus generally not calculated if one of the strings
contains fewer than two bigrams. Unigram scores can be
used in such circumstances.
In order to be able to compare hashed values of different
bigram sets (e.g. ("pe", "et", "te", "er") and ("pe", "et",
"te")), an exhaustive set of subsets (that is, the power set
of each bigram set) is calculated, as described in more
details below (Protocol 1, step 3). For the example above,
the comparison of hashed values would result in the
hashed-value for the bigram set ("pe", "et", "te") to match,
but not the hashed values of bigram sets ("pe", "et", "te",
"er") and ("pe", "et", "te"). A worked example can be
found in Tables 1 and 2. 
Porter and Winkler examined the effects of various string
similarity comparators on the performance of a modern
probabilistic record linkage system [31]. They concluded
that although information-theoretic comparators such as
the Jaro comparator gave slightly better performance, the
Dice bigram co-efficient still produces satisfactory results
[32].
For short strings, Dice's co-efficient can also be calculated
for unigrams (single characters). Extension to higher-
order n-grams and other variations are also possible. For
example, Brew and McKelvie found that addition of
"extended bigrams", which are formed by deleting the
middle letter from each three letter sub string of a word,
decreased the sensitivity of the Dice bigram co-efficient to
transpositions and substitutions in shorter words [33].
Methods
A protocol for minimal-knowledge n-gram similarity 
comparisons
In the following description, bigrams (2-grams) are used,
but the extension to unigrams (single letters), trigrams
and higher order n-grams is direct. We will refer to this
protocol as Protocol 1. 
As previously, Alice and Bob wish to use the services of
Carol to determine whether any of the values in A.a match
any of the values in B.a without revealing to each other or
to Carol what the actual values in A.a and B.a are. Note
that there may be more than one instance of Carol, each
used to handle one of the attributes which are common to
both Alice's and Bob's data collections. Each such instance
of Carol is functionally equivalent, but they do not (and
should not) communicate with each other.
Dice co efficient
bigrams x bigrams y
bigrams x b
− = ×
( ) ∩ ( )
( ) +2 (
| |
| | | igrams y( )|
)
≅Page 5 of 17
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to a) adhere to the protocol; b) not reveal information to
other parties except where permitted by the protocol – in
other words, not to collude with either Alice or Bob
against the other, and; c) not try to determine the values
of Alice's or Bob's source strings using cryptanalytic tech-
niques. The effects of violations of these assumptions are
considered below. There is no assumption that Alice trusts
Bob or vice versa. Alice and Bob do need to share with each
other metadata about the nature of the information con-
tained in their databases – in order to decide which
attributes can be validly compared – but they do not need
to share the actual values of those attributes, nor summary
measures (such as frequency counts) derived from those
values. Alice and Bob do not need to share metadata with
Carol.
In the following description, a "set" refers to a collection
of items which has no inherent order and in which each
item is unique, and a "list" is a sequence of items which
have an inherent order and which are not necessarily
unique. A "tuple" is a collection or set containing two or
more values [34]. It is assumed that Alice and Bob process
the records in their respective data collections in a random
order in order to prevent any information which might be
contained in the record order from inadvertently being
transmitted to Carol or other parties. It is also assumed
that each record in Alice's and Bob's databases has a
unique record identifier (key).
Protocol 1 consists of the following steps:
1. Alice and Bob mutually agree on:
• A secret random key, KAB, which they share only with
each other. For example, Alice might generate KAB using a
random number generator operating over a large number
space, and then transform the result into an SHA hash
value which she encrypts with Bob's public key before
sending it to him. This requires that Bob trusts Alice not to
re-use the same key. Alternatively, Alice and Bob could
arrive at a shared, random key by repeated use of the
"honest coin flip" protocol or, more efficiently, via the
Diffie-Hellman protocol [35-37].
Table 1: Example encrypted tuple for value "peter" created by Alice. For illustrative purposes the record key as well as the bigram 
subset values are shown unencrypted. The tuple matching with Bob's value "pete" (with highest bigram score) is shown bold-faced (see 
also Table 2).
A record key A.a bigram subset A.a_bigram_combination_digest A.a_bigram_ combination_length A.a_length
10 ('er') 0a3be282870998fe7332ae0fecff68cc0d370152 1 4
10 ('et') 8898f53d6225f464bb2640779cb17b9378237149 1 4
10 ('pe') 6fc83a87ee04335a58aa576cb5157625b1b5c51b 1 4
10 ('te') f2bcfb3d76d7fc010e3adc08663090f29c5e928a 1 4
10 ('er', 'et') f86abb0c84889d004b817e86199b3837708d70e9 2 4
10 ('er', 'pe') df99d8658d8165af4552f60ade3662ba98006298 2 4
10 ('er', 'te') edfb618d37ecfafc9735e6ad4675245a4071aa9d 2 4
10 ('et', 'pe') bd7ada000c2b9004b7519b989bfcfdff7ad36678 2 4
10 ('et', 'te') fdcb71db96d2da9b1d19b62944c5f36448cb2668 2 4
10 ('pe', 'te') 71322eeebabff9828aeed3281a86577163e16a78 2 4
10 ('er', 'et', 'pe') 8bf2788ef28443b7a0298f19defa5532db40f63a 3 4
10 ('er', 'et', 'te') c7e9a32e54ba33d3769c4813616fdfcc6306459c 3 4
10 ('er', 'pe', 'te') 33287ce86aa02af0f31d4857a79671c1f4645277 3 4
10 ('et', 'pe', 'te') ecd7b151291f1612595c9f8f385e9f71119a1ae0 3 4
10 ('er', 'et', 'pe', 'te') 65e568493a08a3428595b8be35f6ae2a0f48d170 4 4
Table 2: Example encrypted tuple for value "pete" created by Bob. For illustrative purposes the record key as well as the bigram sub 
set values are shown unencrypted. The tuple matching with Alice's value "peter" (with highest bigram score) is shown bold-faced (see 
also Table 1).
B record key B.a bigram subset B.a_bigram_combination_digest B.a_bigram_ combination_length B.a_length
42 ('et') 8898f53d6225f464bb2640779cb17b9378237149 1 3
42 ('pe') 6fc83a87ee04335a58aa576cb5157625b1b5c51b 1 3
42 ('te') f2bcfb3d76d7fc010e3adc08663090f29c5e928a 1 3
42 ('et', 'pe') bd7ada000c2b9004b7519b989bfcfdff7ad36678 2 3
42 ('et', 'te') fdcb71db96d2da9b1d19b62944c5f36448cb2668 2 3
42 ('pe', 'te') 71322eeebabff9828aeed3281a86577163e16a78 2 3
42 ('et', 'pe', 'te') ecd7b151291f1612595c9f8f385e9f71119a1ae0 3 3Page 6 of 17
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would usually be the HMAC algorithm.
• A standard protocol for pre-processing strings to render
them in a standard form (such as converting all characters
to lower case, removal or substitution of punctuation and
extraneous white space, and so on).
• A mechanism for adding "chaff" which to Carol (or an
attacker) is indistinguishable from real data, but which
subsequently can be "winnowed" by Alice and Bob. Rivest
describes a suitable mechanism [38]. The purpose of such
"chaffing" is to thwart a statistical attack against the keyed
hashes sent to Carol.
2. Alice pre-processes the values in attribute A.a in the
agreed manner and computes the set of bigrams for each
of the resulting values. For example if the value of A.a1 is
"peter" then the set of bigrams is ("pe","et","te","er").
3. Alice then computes the power set (i.e. the subsets of
the original bigram set) of each set of bigrams. Using the
subsets (key hashed as described below) will allow for
partial matching between values in Alice's and Bob's data-
bases. The power set of ("pe","et","te","er") is as follows:
(), ("pe"), ("et"), ("te"), ("er"),
("pe","et"), ("pe","te"), ("pe","er"), ("et","te"), ("et",
"er"), ("te","er"),
("pe","et","te"), ("pe","et","er"), ("pe","te","er"),
("et","te","er"),
("pe","et","te","er")
4. Each set in the power set is converted into a sorted list,
with the exception of the null (empty) set, which is dis-
carded. Each of these sorted lists are then transformed
using the agreed keyed hash algorithm and key KAB. The
resulting vector of digests is stored in an attribute called
A.a_bigram_combination_digest.
5. Using a secret key, KA, known only to herself, Alice cre-
ates keyed hash digests of the record identifiers (keys) for
strings from which each value in attribute
A.a_bigram_combination_digest was derived – she stores
these in A.record_key_digest. She also places the count of
bigrams in each combination used to create each
A.a_bigram_combination_digest in an attribute called
A.a_bigram_combination_length, and the count of
bigrams in each of the original values in A.a in an attribute
called A.a_length. 
6. Alice then creates a set of tuples of the form
(A.record_key_digest, A.a_bigram_combination_digest,
A.a_bigram_combination_length, A.a_length), encrypts
this set using Carol's public key, and sends the result to
Carol. An example of tuples created for the value "peter"
is given in Table 1 (partially unencrypted for illustrative
purposes).
7. Alice sends Carol a list of A.record_key_digest values for
those records in which the value of a, the attribute in ques-
tion, is missing or otherwise unavailable.
8. Bob also carries out steps 2 to 7 using his data collection
attribute B.a, and sends the encrypted set of tuples to
Carol. An example of tuples for the value "pete" is given
in Table 2 (partially un-encrypted for illustrative
purposes).
9. Carol performs an inner equi join of the tuples, using
a_bigram_combination_digest as the join key – in other
words, she determines the intersection of
A.a_bigram_combination_digest and
B.a_bigram_combination_digest. For each row in the
inner join product, Carol calculates the bigram_score (the
Dice co-efficient), which is 2 ×
A.a_bigram_combination_length / (A.a_length +
B.a_length), and selects the maximum bigram_score for
each unique tuple (A.encrypted_record_key,
B.encrypted_record_key) – in other words, the highest
bigram_score for each pair of records from A and B which
share some bigrams in common.
10. Carol reports the similarity scores (including a prede-
fined value used to represent comparison with a missing
value) and the respective encrypted record keys to another
third party who uses the information as input to a blind-
folded record linkage procedure which involves the mini-
mal-knowledge comparison of a number of different
attributes from Alice's and Bob's data collections – that is,
blindfolded similarity comparisons of not only A.a and
B.a, but also A.b and B.b, A.c and B.c and so on, with each
attribute comparison undertaken by a different instance
of Carol. This will be described in more detail below.
Results
Efficiency considerations
The first question to ask is whether the above protocol is
feasible, given the combinatorial explosion in data vol-
ume caused by having to generate the power set of
bigrams for the values being compared: a string which
contains x bigrams gives rise to 2x-1 keyed hash values. For
example, instead of simply having to send a string value
"peter" (5 characters), the hashed values (160 bits or 20
bytes each, assuming we use SHA) for the 15 bigram sub-
sets (shown in step 3 above) have to be communicatedPage 7 of 17
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hash key values for the A.record_key_digest, and the val-
ues of A.a_bigram_combination_length and A.a_length
need to be communicated as well.
This requirement places a practical limit on the length of
strings which can be compared, and makes the method
unsuitable for use with long sequences such as those used
in genomics or proteomics. However, we believe that
using this method with typical name and address charac-
ter strings is quite feasible using high speed research net-
works which are intended for the efficient transmission of
large volumes of data.
To test this, we derived lists of approximately 2.3 million
surnames and suburb names from the residential tele-
phone directories for the Australian state of New South
Wales (NSW), which has a population of approximately
6.5 million, with a large, polyglot immigrant component.
The mean surname and suburb name lengths were 6.4
and 9.3 characters respectively, giving rise to an average of
166 and 2,521 bigram subsets. Each bigram subset is rep-
resented by a 160 bit keyed hash value (using SHA),
which means that the hashed values of all the bigram sub-
sets occupy approximately 520 and 5,400 times more
space than the original surname and suburb values,
respectively. Although this means that the protocol is very
inefficient from a data transmission perspective, the
degree of data inflation is not so great as to render it infea-
sible when used with small- to medium-sized data collec-
tions on dedicated research networks.
One method for improving the efficiency of the protocol
is to avoid creating shorter bigram subsets. In general, we
will only be interested in pairs of values whose bigram
score is greater than some threshold, say 0.7. Alice does
not know the number of bigrams in each of Bob's values,
but she does know the number of bigrams in each of her
own values. She also knows that as the number of bigrams
in Bob's string decreases, her string needs to have fewer
bigrams in common with it in order for the resulting
bigram score to be above a given threshold. The shortest
of Bob's values will have (by definition) a bigram length
of 2. Substituting these values into the equation for the
bigram score, Alice can calculate the minimum number of
bigrams which her value must have in common with
Bob's, regardless of the length of Bob's value. Thus, for
each of her values, Alice can limit the bigram subsets
which she produces to those which have a length equal to
or greater than the minimum length required to reach a
bigram score of 0.7 (or some other arbitrary cut-off). For
example, for a value "peter" – with bigrams
("pe","et","te","er") – at least three bigrams need to be in
common with another value in order to get a bigram score
larger than 0.7. The bigram score for comparing, for exam-
ple, "peter" with "pet" – with bigrams ("pe","et") – will be
2 × 2/(4 + 2)  0.66. Thus, for value "peter", Alice only
needs to communicate bigram subsets of lengths 3 and 4
to Carol (i.e. 5 out of 15 bigram subsets).
Using the same NSW telephone directory data, the reduc-
tions in the overall overhead (that is, communication vol-
ume requirements compared to the original, unencrypted,
surname and suburb values) for thresholds between 0.0
and 1.0 are shown in Table 3.
Security weaknesses in Protocol 1, and some remedies
Protocol 1 meets its design aims of blindfolding Carol to
the values of Alice's and Bob's secret character strings,
while still permitting her to calculate a widely-used meas-
ure of similarity between those strings. The keyed hash
digests of the bigram combinations which are sent to
Carol do not, per se, carry any information about the secret
strings from which they were derived. Nevertheless, fur-
ther consideration of the protocol in the light of two obvi-
ous threat models is warranted.
The first threat is the possibility that Carol might mount a
frequency analysis attack against the keyed hash digests
which she receives. Frequency analysis, which was first
described by the ninth-century Arab scientist al-Kindi,
involves the comparison of the relative frequency of each
symbol (in this case, bigram combination hash values)
with the relative frequencies of equivalent symbols
derived from data which is likely to have a similar fre-
quency distribution of values to the secret source data
[39]. For example, if a particular column contains the sur-
names of patients drawn from a known population, then
the frequency distribution of their values is likely to be
somewhat similar to the distribution of, say, surnames
contained in a telephone directory for that same popula-
tion. This similarity can be used to obtain some informa-
tion about the original values from which hash values are
derived. Such an attack is more likely to succeed if Carol
receives a large number of digests, thus providing her with
better statistical power. In the case of Protocol 1, Carol has
access to information about the number of bigrams which
each hash digest represents, as well as the number of
bigrams in the original strings. In addition, she can easily
determine which bigram hash values were derived from
the same original string, because a hashed record key is
provided as part of each tuple which she receives from
Alice and Bob. Taken together, this information provides
Carol with a large number of clues or "cribs" (to use the
cryptanalytic term) to assist her attack. It should be noted
that the one-way hashing of original values or phonetic
transformations thereof, as described by Dusserre, Quan-
tin, Bouzelat and colleagues, is also vulnerable to such fre-
quency analysis [7-13].
≅Page 8 of 17
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trust Carol not to undertake such cryptanalytic attacks.
This means that not only must Carol be trusted by Alice
and Bob, but also she must implement mechanisms to
protect the data to which she has access from misuse by
both insiders (Carol's own staff) and external attackers.
Protection against the former is particularly difficult. For-
tunately, the processing which Carol is required to carry
out can be both amnestic and completely automated. All
data can be manipulated entirely in volatile random
access memory and never needs to be written to any form
of persistent storage for all but the largest data sets. If
implemented on a secure operating system which pro-
vides mandatory access control, such as NSA Security
Enhanced Linux [40], it should be possible to make it
extremely difficult for even insiders to misappropriate
Carol's data or suborn her processing of it. It is worth not-
ing that a frequency-based cryptanalytic attack against the
hash digest and bigram length data to which Carol has
access would still require considerable skill and resources,
for rather uncertain gains, and thus an attacker would
need to be highly motivated and well resourced – but it
nevertheless remains a theoretical possibility.
An alternative response is to use further separation of
duties in order to reduce the amount of information avail-
able to Carol for use in a frequency-based cryptanalytic
attack. Protocol 2, described below, sets out how this can
be achieved. Additionally, "chaffing" can be used to
obfuscate the frequency information contained in the
hash digest values. This is also discussed further below, in
the context of Protocol 2.
The other threat which needs to be considered is that of
Alice colluding with Carol in an attempt to discover Bob's
secret values, or vice versa. If Carol passes the information
given to her by Bob on to Alice, then it is straightforward
for Alice to mount a dictionary attack against Bob's keyed
hash digests and thus discover the underlying bigram
combinations. With these in hand, reconstruction of
Bob's original, secret values is trivial. 
For these reasons, it is important that Carol, her staff and
her data processing system are as trustworthy as possible,
and that requests to collude from Alice or Bob are refused.
Of course, it is unwise to assume that Carol or her staff
will always behave correctly, or that her processing system
is eternally secure. Thus mechanisms for limiting the con-
sequence of Carol colluding with Alice or Bob need to be
considered.
In the context of record linkage, one method for achieving
this is to employ multiple, independent instances of
Carol, each one receiving and processing information
derived from only one attribute of Alice's and Bob's data
collections. In that way, a security failure or collusion
involving one of these instances of Carol would result in
the compromise or disclosure of only a single data ele-
ment. Provided that the compromised attribute was not a
unique or near unique identifier (such as a social security
number), the risk that individuals might be identified is
quite small. 
Another method for reducing the risk of collusion is to
allocate specific tasks to instances of Carol and other par-
ties only at the very last moment. This is explored in more
detail below. However, we will first describe Protocol 2.
Table 3: Keyed hash bigram subset communication volume. Overhead for various minimum bigram score thresholds compared to the 
unencrypted communication of the original values. The average (unencrypted) surname and suburb name lengths were 6.4 and 9.3 
characters, giving rise to an average of 166 and 2,521 bigram subsets respectively. A total of 2,323,355 records were processed.
Minimum bigram score threshold Surnames Suburb names
Megabytes communicated Overhead Megabytes communicated Overhead
0 7540 520 114399 5435
0.1 7540 520 114384 5435
0.2 7484 516 113787 5406
0.3 7132 492 109679 5211
0.4 6287 434 97300 4623
0.5 4238 292 63892 3036
0.6 2836 196 35091 1667
0.7 1242 86 12154 577
0.8 511 35 3056 145
0.9 185.0 12.7 442.4 21.0
1 45.4 3.13 45.4 2.16
Original values 14.5 1 21.1 1Page 9 of 17
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similarity comparisons
In this variation, we introduce a fourth party, David, who,
like Carol, assists Alice and Bob in carrying out blind-
folded n-gram similarity comparisons of their secret
strings. Carol and David are required to not exchange data
with each other except as set out in the protocol. If they do
collude they are able to assemble the same information as
is available to Carol in Protocol 1 – in other words, they
would still need to mount a frequency-based cryptanalytic
attack in order to discover anything about Alice's or Bob's
original secret values.
Protocol 2 consists of the following steps:
Steps 1 to 4 are identical to Protocol 1.
5. Alice prepares a set of tuples comprising
(A.a_bigram_combination_digest, {(Rrand,
A.record_key_digest, A.a_bigram_combination_length,
A.a_length)} PublicKeyD), where Rrand is an arbitrary random
number and {...} PublicKeyD denotes that the contents are
encrypted with David's public key.
6. Alice encrypts this set of tuples with Carol's public key
and sends the result to her.
7. Bob also carries out steps 1 to 6, using the values in his
attribute B.a, and also sends the result to Carol.
8. Carol determines which values in the attribute
A.a_bigram_combination_digest also appear in
B.a_bigram_combination_digest – in other words, the
intersection of the two attributes of keyed hash digest val-
ues. Carol then sends David a set of tuples which corre-
spond to the intersecting bigram combination keyed hash
digest values, each tuple comprised of ({(Rrand,
A.record_key_digest, A.a_bigram_combination_length,
A.a_length)}PublicKeyD, {(Rrand, B.record_key_digest,
B.a_bigram_combination_length, B.a_length)}PublicKeyD).
9. Using his private key, David decrypts the bigram length
values and calculates a bigram score for tuples he has been
sent. The value Rrand is ignored. David then determines the
maximum bigram score for each unique pairing of
A.record_key_digest and B.record_key_digest.
In Protocol 2, the only information which David is able to
glean about Alice's and Bob's original values is a fre-
quency distribution of the lengths of those values. No
information about the frequencies of the actual values is
available to him. In addition, Carol has much less infor-
mation which she can use to mount a frequency attack
against the bigram hash digests which she receives. Never-
theless, information about the frequency of each bigram
digest is still available to Carol. This information can be
removed by hiding Alice's and Bob's real data amongst
dummy data, analogous to the practice of homophonic
substitution used to prevent frequency analysis of
monoalphabetic ciphers, and related to the technique of
"chaffing and winnowing" suggested by Rivest [41].
For example, keyed hash digests for shorter bigram com-
binations, such as ("pe","te"), will be much less common
than keyed hash digests for longer combinations such as
("er","et","pe","te"). Similarly, bigram combinations
which contain common bigrams, such as "et", will be cor-
respondingly more common overall. In practice, most
bigram combinations will be rare, and only relatively few
will occur more than a few times in any set derived from
real-life names. Alice can dramatically increase the diffi-
culty of frequency analysis by including dummy records,
with the same bigram digest, for those bigram digests
which are relatively common. There is no need to include
dummy records for the vast majority of bigram digests
which occur only once or a few times. Of course, Alice
needs to include an indicator that a record is a dummy in
the information associated with the bigram digest. Carol
is unable to determine the value of this indicator because
the associated information is encrypted with David's pub-
lic key. Thus, the information which Alice prepares in step
5 of Protocol 2 becomes
(A.a_bigram_combination_digest, {(Rrand,
A.record_key_digest, dummy_record_flag,
A.a_bigram_combination_length, A.a_length)} PublicKeyD).
Bob mirrors these steps. In step 9, David simply discards
any tuples in which the dummy_record_flag is set to true.
The other strategies discussed above for improving the
security of Protocol 1, such as "hardening" Carol's and
David's systems to make misuse of the information which
they are sent much more difficult, can also be used with
Protocol 2.
A proof-of-concept implementation of Protocol 2 is given
in an Appendix 1 (see additional file 1) as a series of pro-
grams written in the free, open-source Python language
[42]. The programs simulate the exchange of information
between parties by simply writing files to shared directo-
ries in the computer's file system. Encryption of these
message files has been omitted from this proof-of-concept
implementation in order to facilitate examination of the
information which is passed between parties. Instructions
for obtaining Python and running the demonstration pro-
grams are included in the appendix.
Additional protection through last-minute election of third 
parties
A further means of reducing the risk of collusion between
parties would be to have many Carols and Davids availa-Page 10 of 17
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mutually agree on which instances of Carol and David to
use for each data element (attribute) only at the very last
moment. If the number of instances of Carol and David
available on the network was considerably larger than the
number of data elements in Alice's and Bob's data collec-
tions, an attacker would need to compromise the security
of a large number of computers (or subvert their adminis-
trators) in order to have a reasonable chance of gaining
access to some of the information provided by Alice and
Bob to the chosen instances of Carol or David. The fully
automated nature of the processing carried out by Carol
and David lends itself to replication on multiple hosts on
a network, with each host capable of acting in either rôle.
Such dynamic allocation of tasks to substitutable comput-
ing resources is consistent with the increasingly popular
"Grid" model of computing [43]. It may also be possible
to use the model of public-resource distributed comput-
ing pioneered by the Search for Extraterrestrial Intelli-
gence at Home (SETI@home) project [44].
Some modifications to Protocol 2 would be required if
last minute election were to be used. An additional, initial
step would be required in which Alice and Bob mutually
agree on which instance of Carol and David will be
responsible for processing each of the data elements
which Alice's and Bob's data collections have in common.
A trusted third party should be used to undertake this allo-
cation – because Alice wants to be sure that Bob has no
knowledge of the allocation in advance, and vice versa.
Alternatively, Alice and Bob could use the honest coin flip
or Diffie-Hellman protocols mentioned earlier to perform
the allocation [35,37]. Additionally, because the informa-
tion which Alice and Bob send to a particular instance of
Carol contains data encrypted with the public key of a par-
ticular instance of David, Alice and Bob must indicate to
Carol to which instance of David she should send her
results.
Minimal-knowledge similarity using other string similarity 
functions
Although bigram similarity functions have been shown to
be adequate comparators for record linkage purposes, sev-
eral other string similarity comparators are known to per-
form better, in particular the Jaro comparator and the
Winkler modification of it [31,32,45]. Is it possible to
design minimal-knowledge versions of any of these com-
parison functions?
In fact, designing minimum-knowledge protocols to com-
pute the Jaro or Winkler comparators is relatively straight-
forward, using chaffing and winnowing to hide the real
data from Carol and David. Although such protocols are
computationally feasible for very small data sets, in prac-
tice there is a combinatorial explosion which renders
them impractical for almost all record linkage applica-
tions. One such protocol is given in Appendix 2 (see addi-
tional file 2) in order to stimulate thought.
In order to avoid combinatorial problems, "dynamic pro-
gramming" techniques are often used to calculate similar-
ity measures such as the Levenshtein edit distance when
the original values are known – that is, in non-blind-
folded settings. Related methods are used to calculate the
Jaro and Winkler similarity metrics. Suzuki and Yokoo
have recently demonstrated, in the context of secret com-
binatorial auctions, that secure dynamic programming is
possible using properties of polynomial expressions [46].
Further work is needed to determine whether it is possible
to devise a practical method for calculating the Jaro, Win-
kler and other similarity measures using these techniques.
Minimal-knowledge comparison of scalar values
So far, we have only considered the comparison of charac-
ter strings. Equality comparisons of scalar values such as
numbers or dates can also be performed using methods
similar to those of Protocol 2 – the scalar value is treated
as a sequence of bytes and is transformed by a keyed hash
algorithm in the same way as a character string. Interval or
"delta" comparisons of discrete scalars, such as integers, is
also straightforward, using the following "bracketing"
method.
An attribute of Alice's data collection contains integer val-
ues, perhaps ages in years, and she wishes to determine
which values are within 1 year of values held by Bob. For
each of her records, Alice generates keyed hash digests for
all possible values within the target comparison range. For
a value of 35, Alice sends Carol three tuples each contain-
ing a hash digest of the relevant record key plus hash
digests for the numbers 34, 35 and 36. Bob sends Carol a
single tuple for each value for the equivalent attribute in
his data collection, containing the hash digest of the rele-
vant record key plus the hash digest for the relevant
number – say 36. Carol compares the hash digests in order
to determine which of Alice's and Bob's values are within
the agreed tolerance of each other.
Clearly this technique requires that continuous values are
first converted to discrete values using binning or some
other quantisation method negotiated between Alice and
Bob beforehand. Date and time values can also be com-
pared in a similar fashion by representing them as a count
of time units since the start of an arbitrary epoch.
Comparisons of dates can also take into account common
typographical or representational errors, such as transpo-
sition of day and month, by using a set of rules to generate
likely permutations of a particular date or other value.Page 11 of 17
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informed of the name or nature of the data collection
attribute from which the hash digests which she processes
are derived. Nevertheless, some attributes such as age have
rather characteristic frequency distributions, and it is
therefore important that the "winnowing and chaffing"
described above is used to prevent such frequency infor-
mation from leaking to Carol.
A protocol for blindfolded record linkage
The essence of modern record linkage techniques is the
comparison of a number of partial identifiers (data ele-
ments) between pairs of records from two data collec-
tions, A and B. Each pair of records forms an agreement
pattern (or vector), γ in a comparison space Γ, which is
equivalent to all possible agreement patterns of the par-
tially-identifying attributes a, b,..i which are common to
both A and B. The classical model of probabilistic record
linkage, as formalised in 1969 by Fellegi and Sunter [47],
assumes statistical independence of the comparisons,
although more recent methods may model some depend-
encies between the data elements. 
Thus, the first task is to compare each of the partially-iden-
tifying data elements and return a similarity score
(bigram_score) for each pair. We have demonstrated how
this can be done without revealing the actual values
involved, albeit at the cost of significantly increased com-
munication overhead. In the following discussion, we will
assume the use of Protocol 2 to undertake the minimal-
knowledge similarity comparisons of individual
attributes, and thus refer to Carol and David as the third
and fourth parties. We will refer to the following record
linkage protocol as Protocol 3.
We introduce two new parties: Edith, whose role is to
combine the results of minimal-knowledge comparisons
for individual data items, and Freddy, a putative
researcher who is to receive linked but de-identified
records from Alice's and Bob's data collections.
Protocol 3 consists of the following steps:
1. For each of the partially-identifying data elements, a,
b...i, in their data collections A and B, Alice and Bob dis-
patch the information needed for the similarity compari-
son task defined in Protocol 2 to different instances of
Carol, which we will denote as Carola, Carolb and so on. A
different shared secret hashing key, KAB, should be used
for the information sent to each instance of Carol, because
each of these comparison tasks is independent. As pre-
scribed in Protocol 2, each instance of Carol forwards the
necessary information in encrypted form to the desig-
nated instance of David, who computes the similarity
score (bigram_score) for each pair of Alice's and Bob's
records.
2. Each instance of David then sends the results of his
computations to Edith as a set of tuples of the form
(A.record_key_digest, B.record_key_digest,
data_item_identifier, similarity_score), where
data_item_identifier is the name or some other identifier
of the attributes a,b,...i present in both data collections, A
and B. It may be desirable for each instance of David to
slightly perturb and/or quantise the similarity_score val-
ues before sending them to Edith, in order to reduce the
frequency information present in these scores – informa-
tion which could assist Edith in a cryptanalytic attack.
Note that not every possible combination of
A.record_key_digest and B.record_key_digest will be
present in the data sent to Edith by each instance of David
-only those record pairs for which the similarity score was
greater than some threshold score. It is a common practice
in many record linkage systems to disregard similarity
scores below a threshold, such as 0.8 [31]. Reduction of
the record comparison space by this means has been
found to have good coverage properties compared to tra-
ditional record linkage "blocking" using compound
indexes [48]. 
Edith also receives record pairs for comparisons in which
one or both values were missing.
3. Edith then performs an outer join of these data using
the tuple (A.record_key_digest, B.record_key_digest) as
the join key, to form tuples of the form:
(A.record_key_digest, B.record_key_digest,
a.similarity_score,
b.similarity_score, ..., i.similarity_score)
If Edith receives no similarity score for a particular data
item in a particular row in this matrix, the similarity score
is taken to be zero, indicating disagreement for that data
item. The number of rows in the matrix assembled by
Edith will be considerably less than the product of the
number of rows in A and B, for the reason discussed
above.
4. Edith now multiplies this matrix by vectors of individ-
ual comparison weights – one each for agreement, disa-
greement and missing values. Comparison weights for
various degrees of similarity, derived from the similarity
score, can also be used. The resulting values are summed
row-wise and the ratio of the summed agreement weights
to the summed disagreement weights is calculated – this
value is known as the "matching weight". The matchingPage 12 of 17
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matching parameters, in order to classify records as
matches, possible matches and non-matches. A more
complete exposition of the Fellegi-Sunter model can be
found in [49]. In many circumstances adequate results (in
terms of acceptable numbers of false matches and missed
matches) can be obtained using individual comparison
weights and matching parameters which are determined
heuristically by inspection of candidate pairs of records.
Such an approach is unacceptable in the context of blind-
folded record linkage. It may be possible to use weights
and parameters derived from other matching exercises.
However, as Winkler has pointed out, comparison
weights for individual data items are strongly influenced
by the error rates for those data items in each data collec-
tion, or in particular subsets of data collections [50]. Thus
the re-use of weights and parameters which have been
found to work well in one setting may be quite subopti-
mal in other settings. 
Fortunately, it is possible to estimate individual compari-
son weights and the matching parameters directly from
the data. Fellegi and Sunter described a method for doing
this in certain constrained circumstances when condi-
tional independence of each data item was assumed. Win-
kler demonstrated that the EM (expectation
maximisation) algorithm could be used to calculate
match weights and parameters with fewer assumptions,
including relaxation of the conditional independence
assumption [51]. "Scoring" and Markov chain Monte
Carlo methods can also be used [52,53]. An unresolved
problem is that although these techniques produce an
optimal partitioning of pairs of records based on the
match weights, the resulting partitions may not corre-
spond exactly to matches and non-matches. Nevertheless,
Quantin et al. reported that in a trial of automated record
linkage using weights determined by EM, a sensitivity of
0.97 and specificity of 0.93 was achieved compared to tra-
ditional, manual linkage of the same data [12].
We will assume that Edith uses one of these automatic
methods to estimate matching weights and parameters,
and thus arrives at a set of linked records in A and B – or
more precisely, pairs of (A.record_key_digest,
B.record_key_digest). Researcher Freddy now needs to be
supplied with anonymous (or at worst de-identified)
records containing the required data from Alice and Bob's
data collections – but only for these linked records. In
doing so, Alice must not learn which of her records match
Bob's, and vice versa. There is a straightforward solution
to this problem using public key encryption.
5. Alice assembles the data required by Freddy for every
record in her database, and encrypts each record with
Freddy's public key, and associates the resulting cipher
text with the corresponding record_key_digest. Alice
sends these data to Edith. Bob does the same. Edith now
performs an inner join of these data with her list of match-
ing records, using the record_key_digest values as the join
key. Edith forwards the encrypted data records from this
inner join to Freddy, who decrypts the data for each record
using his private key. 
Thus, Freddy obtains the data items he needs, but only for
the linked records. Edith learns the number of linked
records but is unable to inspect the actual data (because it
is encrypted with Freddy's key), and Alice and Bob learn
nothing.
It must be recognised that although the linked informa-
tion which Freddy receives lacks any directly identifying
data items such as names or dates of birth, the conjunc-
tion of other less specific attributes from Alice's and Bob's
data collection may render the data readily re-identifiable
in the presence of external information. Freddy therefore
needs to ensure that the data he receives is stored securely
and used ethically – in other words, that no attempt is
made to re-identify the data unless the study protocol spe-
cifically permits this. Alice and Bob may, quite reasona-
bly, require that Freddy only uses the data he has received
in a special-purpose secure analysis facility, which has
tight controls on the information which may enter and
leave the facility – analogous to the special facilities in
which microbiologists and virologists are required to
work when handling hazardous organisms. Indeed, Edith
could be instructed to forward the linked data file,
encrypted with Freddy's public key, to a suitable secure
analysis facility. Freddy would then need to bring his pri-
vate key to that facility in order to decrypt and analyse the
data.
Extension to frequency-based matching
Protocol 3 does not provide for the use of information
about the relative frequency of particular names or other
data items as part of the linkage process. Newcombe et al.
introduced the idea of using such information [54], based
on the intuition that two records with the surname
"Stockhausen" are more likely to represent the same per-
son than two records with the surname "Smith". Fellegi
and Sunter gave two methods for estimating frequency-
based weights [47]. Winkler subsequently extended this
work to use the EM algorithm for frequency-based param-
eter estimation [55].
In the context of blindfolded record linkage, it is impor-
tant that Alice or Bob do not provide precise information
about the relative frequencies of particular values in their
data collections to any other party, because such informa-
tion provides the basis for a frequency-based cryptanalytic
attack against the values. However, if Alice and Bob trustPage 13 of 17
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vide her with approximate relative frequency information
for each of the attributes in the comparison vector to
Edith. Such a step needs to be taken advisedly, because it
provides Edith with quite a lot of information which she
can use in a cryptanalytic attack against Alice's and Bob's
data. In addition, Winkler has noted that frequency-based
linkage does not always improve matching completeness
and accuracy, and that it may not be needed if there is suf-
ficient redundancy in the data items available for match-
ing [56]. More work is required to quantitatively assess the
marginal gain afforded by frequency information in situ-
ations in which blindfolded record linkage might be used. 
Discussion
Other uses for blindfolded record linkage protocols
So far we have concentrated on the use of blindfolded
record linkage protocols for epidemiological studies.
However, there are a number of other potential uses.
One example is the provision of privacy-preserving geoc-
oding services. "Geocoding" is the process of converting
an address or place name into a pair of geographical co-
ordinates, such as latitude and longitude. This is done by
matching a target address or place name against a compre-
hensive database of geo-referenced addresses and place
names, and returning the co-ordinates associated with the
matching address (or addresses if the match is not singu-
lar). Because typographical errors in addresses and place
names are common, it is important that the matching
algorithm employed by the geocoding engine uses some
form of similarity comparator in order to achieve good
match rates.
The geo-referenced database can be distributed in toto to
parties wishing to geocode their data, but this may pose
problems due to the size, volatility or proprietary nature
of the database. Alternatively, parties can transmit
addresses or place names to a centralised geocoding serv-
ice, thus avoiding the need to distribute the reference
database and associated geocoding engine [57]. A prob-
lem with the latter model is the unavoidable loss of pri-
vacy associated with the need to reveal addresses to the
geocoding service.
However, it is easy to design a privacy-preserving geocod-
ing service using a minor variation of the blindfolded
record linkage protocol described above.
Alice is a client of the service. She has one or more
addresses which she wishes to geocode without revealing
what those addresses actually are. Bob has a geo-refer-
enced database of addresses which he does not wish to
distribute to other parties for business or logistical rea-
sons. Using standardised parsing methods, such as those
described in [58], Bob preprocesses his entire database,
separating each address into attributes, such as street
number, street name, street type, suburb and so on (Bob
may already have his addresses stored like this). Alice pre-
processes her address(es) in the same manner. Alice indi-
cates to Bob that she wishes to make use of the geocoding
service, and with the assistance of multiple instances of
Carol and David, the pair carry out the steps described in
Protocol 2. One instance of Carol and David is used for
each address attribute. 
The similarity information for each address attribute is
then assembled and processed by Edith as described in
Protocol 3, perhaps with some minor differences. In step
4, simpler, deterministic linkage methods using prede-
fined match weights and parameters might be employed,
rather than probabilistic techniques. In step 5, there is no
need for Alice to provide encrypted data to Edith. Rather,
Bob would provide Edith with a set of tuples comprising
the encrypted record key for each address record in his ref-
erence database, together with the co-ordinates for that
address, encrypted using Alice's public key. Based on the
results of the matching process, Edith simply forwards the
relevant record(s) from this set of tuples to Alice, who
then decrypts the co-ordinates for each of her original
addresses. No-one other than Alice knows what these
addresses or their co-ordinates are, and Bob only needs to
reveal an encrypted (via keyed hashes) version of his geo-
referenced address database to external parties. This
scheme provides good protection against attacks by any
one of the parties involved but, as discussed above, is vul-
nerable to collusion between either Alice or Bob and the
various instances of Carol, David and Edith. Last-minute
election of substitutable services can be used to mitigate
this risk.
Berman [59] has described a "threshold" method for
annotating confidential medical records. Although the
method dissociates information from particular patient
records, it does not guarantee that confidential or identi-
fying information does not leak to the annotating entity.
Protocol 2 could be used to secure the annotation. It
could also be used by pharmaceutical companies who
wish to determine whether candidate names for new
drugs which they have under development are similar to
new drug names being considered by their competitors,
without having to reveal the actual names. n-grams can
also be formed from words (or other tokens), rather than
individual letters. Thus, minimum-knowledge n-gram
similarity comparisons can be used to compare record-or
line-oriented text or data, such as poetry or computer pro-
gram code, or any other information comprising
sequences of tokens. In the case of computer program
code, the output of the tokeniser built into the language
compiler or interpreter could be used as input to detectPage 14 of 17
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revealing their intellectual property. The only proviso is
that the average number of words or tokens in each line
must be reasonably small. For this reason the technique is
unlikely to be suitable for the comparison of genomic or
proteomic sequences. 
Conclusion
In this paper we have demonstrated that it is possible to
perform minimal-knowledge similarity comparisons
between strings, using keyed hash combinations of n-
grams, albeit at the cost of considerable computing and
communications overhead. Minimal-knowledge compar-
ison of scalar quantities is also described, using a related
"bracketing" technique. We have outlined how these tech-
niques can be combined with public key cryptography
and current probabilistic record linkage techniques to cre-
ate a generalised framework for blindfolded record
linkage.
Traditional methods of record linkage are vulnerable to
misdeeds by or compromise of single parties, particular
the party undertaking the linkage. Although the protocols
described in this paper are not unconditionally secure,
they do make it much harder for any one party involved
in a linkage operation to determine any useful informa-
tion about the data being linked. The protocols remain
vulnerable to collusion between, or simultaneous com-
promise of, two or more parties. However, because most
of the computation involved can be fully automated, it is
possible to use last-minute allocation of tasks to substitut-
able service providers to minimise the likelihood of such
collusion or compromise.
An immediate task is the creation of a generic blindfolded
record linkage application framework, in which different
minimal-knowledge comparison protocols can be tri-
alled. This work is under way, as part of the freely-availa-
ble, open-source Febrl research project [60,61], and some
results obtained with real-life data sets will be reported
subsequently. Further exploration of the utility of varia-
tions of n-gram comparators would also be valuable, as
well as evaluation of the impact of limiting the number of
n-gram combinations used in Protocol 2. 
The potential use of blindfolded record linkage to pre-
serve privacy also poses some interesting ethical and phil-
osophical questions. Most record linkage studies require
either individual consent by the subjects whose records
are to be linked, or more usually, a determination by an
ethics committee or institutional review board that the
public good which is likely to accrue from the study out-
weighs the invasion of personal privacy posed by the
study. However, it could be argued from the perspective of
Berkeley's idealism that if record linkage can be under-
taken without revealing any identifying information to
anyone who does not already have access to that informa-
tion, then there is no invasion of privacy [62]. Despite the
imperfections in the protocols presented here, we hope
that this paper stimulates further work on blindfolded
record linkage.
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